The Efficient Boundary of Inventorship and Authorship by Kan, Steven S.
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology 
& Intellectual Property Law 
Volume 19 
Issue 2 Spring 2009 Article 3 
The Efficient Boundary of Inventorship and Authorship 
Steven S. Kan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip 
Recommended Citation 
Steven S. Kan, The Efficient Boundary of Inventorship and Authorship, 19 DePaul J. Art, Tech. & Intell. 
Prop. L. 235 (2009) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss2/3 
This Lead Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law by an authorized editor of 
Via Sapientiae. For more information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
THE EFFICIENT BOUNDARY OF
INVENTORSHIP AND AUTHORSHIP
By Steven S. Kan1
ABSTRACT
Knowledge works have their creators. As structural changes in
economic development have made collaboration indispensable for
a knowledge project, courts are increasingly involved with
inventorship and authorship disputes because neither is statutorily
defined. Through a workflow model of knowledge creation, this
Note elucidates virtual transactions, market substitutable
endeavors, and their associated transaction costs to pin down
intellectual contribution as the efficient boundary of inventorship
and authorship. A review of frequently cited cases shows that
American judges have insisted on intellectual contribution in
determining true inventorship and authorship and helped to
develop the United States into the world's knowledge center in the
twentieth century.
1. Visiting Professor, Graduate Institute of Law and Economics, College of
Economics, Zhejiang University. I am grateful to Dean Jin-Chuan Shi for
relieving some of my teaching duty, to Professors Tze-Shiou Chien and Chun-
Sin Hwang for helpful comments and suggestions, and to former thesis student
Lydia Liu for inspiring me into this interesting research. For previous drafts
leading to this Note, I appreciate the encouragement and feedback of law and
economics seminar participants at Nanjing University of Science and
Technology, Zhejiang University, and National Tsing Hua University, and
conference participants at Taiwan's First Conference on Empirical Law
Research and the Sixth Chinese Law and Economics Forum. Any merit of this
Note is God's grace; all errors are mine.
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I. INTRODUCTION
To whom a patented invention or a copyrighted work owes its
intellectual contribution should be as important as who owns the
intellectual property. The reason is that an intellectual property
simply cannot come into existence without someone having made
the intellectual contribution. Additionally, patent and copyright
infringement lawsuits have often turned into disputes over the true
inventor and author involved. The promotion of science and the
useful arts, therefore, comprises two parts-the protection of
intellectual property as an object of commercial exchange and the
protection of the subject making intellectual contribution.2 Insofar
as an inventor has the patent application right and an author has
the initial ownership of copyright, the laws even suggest that
intellectual property protection has actually stemmed from the
intended constitutional protection of subjects making intellectual
contributions.3  Nevertheless, moral rights that protect non-
pecuniary interests of authors in civil law countries are just
beginning to catch the attention of American legal scholarship.4
2. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." (emphasis
added)).
3. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2006) (initial ownership of copyright); 35 U.S.C.
§ 11 l(a)(1) (2006) (patent application right).
4. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an
American Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1985), for an introduction
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Similarly, in sharp contrast with voluminous law and economics
literature on intellectual property protection,5 there is little
attention to the protection of subjects making intellectual
contribution from an economic perspective.6
In the United States, only the author of a work of visual art has
the statutory right of attribution.7 Attribution of true inventors and
authors is thus primarily protected through court standards
developed from case decisions. Determination of inventors and
authors, however, presents a problem in court because
inventorship and authorship are not statutorily defined. As a
result, litigants proclaim their inventorship or authorship through
attribution in a patent application or a copyright registration, or
allege that they have made some contribution to the invention or
authorial work at dispute.
The United States has nonetheless become the world's top
knowledge center in the 20th century. Since problematic
determination of disputed inventorship and authorship may
adversely affect the accumulation of scientific and artistic
knowledge stocks, this Note inquires into how American judges
of moral rights and an analysis of their compatibility to the United States legal
system. But see Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Article, Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47
HARV. INT'L L.J. 353 (2006), for alternatives in the United States legal system
that would tackle some of the concerns raised by scholars advocating moral
rights. Ms. Rigamonti argued that statutory enactment of moral rights in the
United States has likely reduced authorial protection.
5. For example, the protection of intellectual property is featured prominently
in WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2003) and STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATION OF
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2004). While the latter is silent on attribution
protection, the former only considers it to fall in the realm of other laws against
fraud.
6. For an exception, see Catherine L. Fisk, Credit Where It's Due: The Law
and Norms of Attribution, 95 GEO. L.J. 49 (2006) (detailing attribution's role in
signaling human capital in knowledge economy). Additionally, a related
bargaining model of name orderings that neglects the distinction between true
and false authors is in Maxim Engers et al., First-Author Conditions, 107 J. POL.
ECON. 859 (1999).
7. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006). Enacted in the Visual Artists Rights Act of
1990, the attribution right enables the author to claim authorship of her work
and to exclude others from using her name for a work she did not create. The
author can enjoy the right throughout her life; additionally, she may waive it in
writing, but not transfer it. See id.
237
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have contributed to the great American achievement through
relevant court standards.8 Filling the gap of law and economics
literature, I use a workflow model of knowledge creation to obtain
a set of economic logic establishing intellectual contribution as the
efficient boundary of inventorship and authorship. In this
framework, frequently cited court cases since late 19th century are
carefully reviewed. Consistent with the set of economic logic, my
case review shows that courts have scrutinized litigants' actual
endeavors in the knowledge project at dispute and established
intellectual contribution as the boundary of invention conception,
copyright originality, sole inventorship, and sole authorship. By
insisting on intellectual contribution and protecting true knowledge
creators, American judges have served the Copyright Clause well
and helped to develop the United States into the world's top
knowledge center.
The economic logic and the outstanding contribution of judges
to knowledge accumulation can be intuitively appreciated. Since
knowledge projects of scientific or artistic nature share some
common workflow steps, a workflow model is adopted to include
the following six common steps: (1) initiating a project idea; (2)
gathering data; (3) conducting experiments; (4) confirming the
project idea; (5) instantiating the confirmed project idea; and (6)
fixing consistent instantiations in a tangible medium.9 Before the
19th century, all the six workflow steps were taken by the same
person to become an inventor or author. As specialization and the
division of labor deepened with technological progress and market
expansion, it became unnecessary for a knowledge creator to
perform all the steps. Economic development over time also
changed the configuration of transaction costs, and the changes
8. For increasing concerns about misattribution of knowledge works, see
Kyle Grimshaw, A Victory for the Student Researcher: Chou v. University Of
Chicago, DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 35 (2001), Lisa G. Lerman, Misattribution in
Legal Scholarship: Plagiarism, Ghostwriting, and Authorship, 42 S. TEX. L.
REV. 467 (2001), and Sean B. Seymore, My Patent, Your Patent, or Our Patent?
Inventorship Disputes Within Academic Research Groups, 16 ALB. L.J. Sci. &
TECH. 125 (2006).
9. The workflow model is process-centered instead of "work-centered"; for
the latter approach and criticisms against it, see Ryan Littrell, Note, Toward a
Stricter Originality Standard for Copyright Law, 43 B.C. L. REV. 193 (2001).
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have been manifesting in various ways."° As a result, useful data
can now be acquired by paying fees to database operators and
experiments can be conducted by students. The structural changes
have caused scientific and artistic knowledge projects to involve a
number of participants. Attribution disputes rose, in part, because
participants who performed some steps started to claim attribution
in courts.
The make-or-buy decision associated with a knowledge project
is, in the Coasian perspective, dependent on the comparison
between internal and market transaction costs." The promotion of
science and useful arts can certainly be better met by allowing
knowledge creators to utilize services available in the market
because of the low transaction cost involved. A market
substitutable endeavor, however, represents application of existing
knowledge but not creation of new scientific or artistic knowledge.
On the other hand, inventors and authors must engage in costly
virtual transactions with targeted patrons in their minds, for
example, patent examiners and journal referees. The costs are
particularly high and risky because they cannot interact with their
targeted patrons as in a Coasian real exchange. Thus, intellectual
contribution resulting from costly virtual transaction is the
efficient boundary of inventorship and authorship. 2
10. Structural changes related to inventive activities were carefully
researched by Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Market Trade in
Patents and the Rise of a Class of Specialized Inventors in the 19th-Century
United States, 91 AM. ECON. Ass'N ARTICLES & PROc 39 (2001) (arguing that
growing division of labor between specialized inventors and businesses
commercializing their inventions was the result of a market in patents); Kenneth
L. Sokoloff & B. Zorina Khan, The Democratization of Invention During Early
Industrialization: Evidence from the United States, 1790-1846, 50 J. ECON.
HIST. 363 (1990) (arguing that early inventors were dispersed over the
population and their skills were not specialized).
11. See generally R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Finn, in THE FIRM, THE
MARKET, AND THE LAW 33 (1988) (analyzing the firm as a nexus of contracts).
See Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Management
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976)
for the origin of the term "nexus of contract." See also Steven N.S. Cheung,
The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1983) (expounding
further on the "nexus of contract" theme).
12. Inasmuch as the boundary of firm is indeterminate in Coase's seminal
article, The Nature of the Firm, additional specificity is needed to determine the
239
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In the remaining discussion, Section I introduces the workflow
model, explains attribution's organizational roles, and obtains the
first element of the economic logic-it is inefficient to grant
attribution to every participant of a knowledge project. Section II
elucidates virtual transaction, market substitutable endeavor, and
the transaction costs involved. Two additional elements of the
economic logic are obtained along the way; namely, it is
inefficient to attribute whoever made nothing but market
substitutable endeavors and whoever only paid others for a
consistent project she did not envision. Abstracting from the
complication of opportunistic behaviors lurking in intellectual
collaboration, this Section establishes intellectual contribution as
the efficient boundary of inventorship and authorship. 3 Section
III reviews cases regarding invention conception, copyright
originality, sole inventorship, and sole authorship to show how
courts reached their decisions as if they had a firm grasp of the
workflow model and the set of economic logic. A brief conclusion
then follows.
II. THE WORKFLOW MODEL OF ATTRIBUTION
DETERMINATION
The workflow model is the most salient tool adopted in this
Note to penetrate into the problem at hand. This Section starts by
describing the workflow model's six common workflow steps and
its three assumptions. As workflow steps represent how a project
is organized to create new knowledge, attribution has its
organizational role in the creation of knowledge works, scientific
or artistic. It also has an organizational role in the distribution and
use of knowledge works. These organizational roles are
introduced with an emphasis on how attribution helps reduce
transaction costs in the society. " Lastly, I analyze the optimal
boundary of inventorship and authorship. In this sense the workflow model
provides the specificity for the efficiency result.
13. Note that my argument of the efficient boundary is abstracted from the
complication of opportunistic behaviors between intellectual collaborators.
Cases regarding joint inventorship and authorship are thus not reviewed here.
14. See Justin Hughes, The Personality Interest of Artists and Inventors in
Intellectual Property, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 81, 114 (1998) (criticizing
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number of attributions of a knowledge work.
A. The Six Common Workflow Steps
Workflow is a general concept about the sequence of work steps
and usually drawn as a flowchart.15 A flowchart consists of a
number of blocks, in various shapes suggesting the different
natures of the steps, and a number of arrows linking the blocks to
indicate the structural relationship. There are flowcharts indicating
specific sequential steps to be followed by line workers in a
factory. The flowchart for customer return of merchandise is
usually posted at the customer service center. Software
programmers and engineers probably cannot finish a day without
reading or drawing a flowchart. While their work steps can be
similarly arranged in a flowchart, writers, painters, and legal
scholars usually finish a year's work without drawing one.
The flowchart of Figure 1 shows the six common steps of the
workflow model. From the top to the bottom, they are the steps of
initiating a project idea, gathering data, conducting experiments,
confirming the project idea, instantiating the confirmed project
idea, and fixing consistent instantiations in a tangible medium.
The workflow steps seem, at first glance, to fit better with
scientific and engineering endeavors leading to inventions. They
also fit literary and other artistic endeavors leading to works of
copyrightable subject matter. The following prose-writing
simulation offers an example.16
court holdings to have sacrificed "true" consumer sovereignty). The criticism
erred in pitting knowledge creators against consumers; contrarily, economic
tradeoffs measured in transaction costs that are bome by both knowledge
creators and consumers are the focus of my organizational perspective of
attribution.
15. See, e.g., WIL VAN DER AALST & KEES VAN HEE, WORKFLOW
MANAGEMENT: MODELS, METHODS, AND SYSTEMS (2004).
16. The simulation is adapted from Zhu Zi Qing's Back Shadow, an early
20th century Chinese prose that is still being adopted by primary schools across
the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.
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Figure 1: The Workflow Model of Knowledge Project
After being touched by an emotional parting scene at the train
station of her home town, a writer came to the idea of a father's
love for his son. There could be many options in setting up her
story. She searched, perhaps through recollection, parting themes
written by others. She tried experimenting with a quiet, chilly
morning scene to usher in on readers' mind that something was
about to happen. As she wrote further, it became clear that she did
not really want to build on that scene because the story would be
too cold and sorrowful. She realized that she needed something
material to show how a father expressed his love. With some more
soul searching and experiments, she returned with the confirmed
project idea that the son's feeling for his father's love was what
she really wanted. She did more experiments with her pen to find
that she'd better use a sack of oranges carried by the father to
instantiate his love for his son.
Eventually, she finished her piece and successfully got it
published in a magazine. Readers experienced, from the eyes of
the son, that the father, wearing the traditional Chinese long robe,
hurried to the crowded and noisy train station with a sack of
oranges in his hands, crossed the tracks and accidentally stumbled,
picked up one by one the oranges spread around the tracks, placed
them backed to the sack, and climbed up again with a smile to
send off his son. They found their eyes moist when the son was
trying to freeze the blurry back shadow of his father while the
8
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locomotive started cranking and accelerated its momentum.
As suggested, the prose writer went through all the six workflow
steps. The upper return curve of Figure 1 indicates further that she
experienced an iterative process before confirming the project
idea. Similarly, another iterative process, indicated by the lower
return curve in Figure 1, took place before the consistent
instantiations of her confirmed project idea were fixed in a
tangible medium. 7
It takes no more imagination to see that composers, painters, and
architects must go through these steps to complete their knowledge
projects. Performing artists need to test different moods before
they can instantiate confirmed emotional effects in facial looks,
hand gestures, or musical instruments. Unlike writers and painters
whose work in progress is usually fixed in a tangible medium,
performing artists need to take a separate fixing step.'8 The case
for photographers, however, needs an expanded view to appreciate
that similar steps are indeed there. It is so because photographs of
live events are usually taken in a split second and photographers
have neither time for experiments nor the iterative process as
writers or painters do. In the expanded view of a series of
photographs taken over a live event, it can be seen that the
photographer is experimenting through the many shots, and her
selection of the picture afterwards involves an iterative process. 9
The difference between scientific and artistic endeavors of
knowledge creation, therefore, is not with the steps but with the
data, instruments, and materials used to instantiate and fix their
knowledge work. For instance, instantiation in the context of a
17. Crossing of the two return curves, though common, is not discussed for
simplicity.
18. See Bethany M. Forcucci, Note, Dancing Around the Issues of
Choreography & Copyright: Protecting Choreographers After Martha Graham
School and Dance Foundation, Inc. v. Martha Graham Center of Contemporary
Dance, Inc., 24 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 931 (2006) (discussing additional
endeavors to fulfill the fixing requirement in choreography).
19. See generally Alan L. Durham, The Random Muse: Authorship and
Indeterminacy, 44 WM. & MARY L. REv. 569 (2002) (discussing the
experiment-selection processes in fine arts and music); Christine Haight Farley,
The Lingering Effects of Copyright's Response to the Invention of Photography,
65 U. PiTT. L. REv. 385 (2004) (arguing that the authorship doctrine effectively
perpetuates the authorless photography)..
243
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patentable invention, usually referred to as embodiment by patent
specialists, may involve a particular material applied under a
specified range of temperature and in a definite sequence to make
it work best.
Three assumptions are behind the chosen workflow steps. The
flowchart in Figure 1 does not include the step of obtaining the
necessary funds for the project. Funding, however, is very
important; no project can be completed without it. Its omission
indicates an assumption of funding irrelevance. Funding is a
major factor in determining ownership. Therefore, there is an
assumption of ownership irrelevance, removing it from the
attribution paradigm. 2' The justification for the assumption is that
attribution of an inventor's or author's name has its own
independent value separate from the, admittedly related, ownership
interest.2' Particularly, recent research in legal history has
suggested that a gradual separation of ownership and attribution
has indeed started no later than the latter half of the nineteenth
century.
2
My second assumption, the fixing assumption, relates to the last
20. See generally Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Authorship Without
Ownership: Reconsidering Incentives in a Digital Age, 52 DEPAUL L. REv.
1121 (2003) (providing alternative marketing model of works without copyright
enforcement). Total dominance of ownership is implicit in Sara K. Stadler,
Forging a Truly Utilitarian Copyright, 91 IOWA L. REv. 609 (2006) (arguing
that exclusive copyrights should be restricted under a full-fledged utilitarian
system).
21. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006) (work for hire); 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006)
(assignment of patent application). Under the work-for-hire system, journalists,
for example, are attributed at the bylines of a newspaper. Via pre-invention
assignment, an inventor retains attribution while future patent ownership would
be transferred to her employer. As for a work of visual art, attribution and
ownership are clearly recognized as two separate rights. See also Beech
Aircraft Corp. v. EDO Corp., 990 F.2d 1237, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (opining
that inventorship and patent ownership are separate issues).
22. Catherine L. Fisk, Authors at Work: The Origins of the Work-for-Hire
Doctrine, 15 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (2003) (showing that courts recognized
employers' ownership interests before the enactment of the work-for-hire
doctrine); Catherine L. Fisk, Removing the 'Fuel of Interest' from the 'Fire of
Genius': Law and the Employee-Inventor, 1830-1930, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 1127
(1998) (demonstrating that the rise of corporations and employment contracts
have influenced court decisions).
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step where knowledge works considered are fixed in a tangible
medium. As copyright protects only works fixed in a tangible
medium and patent specification is also contained in a tangible
medium, the fixing assumption limits my scope within
copyrightable works and patentable inventions.23
The upper return curve in Figure 1 indicates that the first idea
initiated may be revised or abandoned. It also shows that some
data collected and experiments conducted may not be directly
related to the confirmed project idea of step four. As the arrow
between steps five and six shows, the fixed tangible medium
contains consistent instantiations, which are in turn derived from
the confirmed project idea, as shown by the arrow between steps
four and five. Therefore, the third assumption, consistent project
assumption, is that steps four, five, and six are consistent with one
another. With the consistent project assumption, the knowledge
work whose attribution is to be determined in court is defined by
the content of the fixed tangible medium as a result of consistent
steps four and five. Intellectual contributions in steps one through
three are thus defined only with respect to the consistent project
steps from four through six. Therefore, the assumption helps
avoid repetitive discussions over abandoned ideas, unrelated data,
or failed experiments.
B. Organizational Roles of Attribution
Knowledge creators do not live in isolated islands. Their
literary, artistic, or inventive works have exchange value;
otherwise, there would be no reason to promote and protect the
commercial exchange of intellectual property. If their unfinished
works or diaries have any meaningful value beyond their life, the
value must stem from the social economy where they have been a
23. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) ("The specification shall contain a written
description of the invention.") In this sense, the workflow model complements
the intriguing argument for promoting the protection of ideas by Arthur R.
Miller, Common Law Protection for Products of the Mind: An "Idea" Whose
Time Has Come, 119 HARV. L. REv. 703 (2006). However, it is not my
intention to argue that the same economic logic derived here can be exactly
applied to his non-fixed ideas.
11
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member. 24 An unfinished painting Mary's mother gave her has no
use value because Mary has been keeping it in the basement for
years. It neither has any intrinsic value because Mary has not been
keeping it for its sake. It has value to Mary because it was from
her mother. By additionally considering Mary's mother as a
famous painter, we may find the unfinished painting to have been,
instead, exhibited in Mary's living room all along, especially if her
mother had signed it. It helps show that attribution enhances
personhood, use, and exchange values. The personhood theory
also helps a better appreciation of the inalienability of attribution.25
Organizational roles of attribution in a social economy can best
be understood through both the use and the creation of knowledge
works. Users of various tastes and interests are dispersed in the
economy.26  Without an efficacious network of distribution
channels, users will not be able to know what, where, and when a
knowledge work is available. Without a social convention in
communicating a knowledge work, an efficacious network of
distribution channel is also impossible.
In legal scholarship, for example, the citation of a law review
article includes the author name, the title, the journal, the issue and
the beginning page, and the year published, whereas the citation of
a book does not include the book publisher.27 It is quite clear that
communication between legal scholars will be ineffective without
such a convention. It goes without saying that there are different
conventions in relating to a movie by ordinary movie goers and a
patent by specialists in the field. More importantly, personhood
24. William M. Landes, Copyright Protection of Letters, Diaries, and Other
Unpublished Works: An Economic Approach, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 79 (1992)
(suggesting that the protection of unpublished works is related more to privacy
and the First Amendment than copyright interest per se).
25. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV.
957 (1982) for the personhood theory of value. See Margaret Jane Radin,
Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987) for inalienability. Mass
production, however, has diluted the and created confusion as to the significance
of attribution of patented widgets.
26. The intellectual origin of dispersed knowledge and spontaneous order is
traced to CARL MENGER, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICs (1976).
27. The difference may be related to the fact that, while an academic journal
is a long lasting serial, a book's copyright may be reassigned to another
publisher a few years later.
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represented by the name of a scholar, actress, or inventor stands
out as the focal point of the conventions. It is similarly imaginable
how hard it would be for users to purchase a music CD or for
wholesalers and retailers to strike a deal, if a musician's name is
forgotten. The point is that attribution represents a social
organization in communicating users' wants, distributing
commercial products, and facilitating social communication
among users.28
The economic ideas of specialization and the division of labor
suggest that there is also a counterpart social organization of
knowledge creation. After the specialization in printing
developed, an amateur writer could just visit a printer to buy the
service without using her own pen to personally write many copies
of her work. With the time saved, the writer could become
specialized in writing stories. On the other hand, while the firm is
an economic unit of social organization, it also utilizes the benefits
of specialization and the division of labor in organizing itself. For
instance, knowledge creating corporations like IBM, Intel, and
Microsoft have project teams whose members take some role in
the six workflow steps. In a modem work environment, the
number of knowledge works attributed to an employee is often the
basis for job promotion or salary raise. It is also highly valued
between firms because of competition in both product and factor
markets. Without a proper organization of attribution, a company
or research institution cannot rely on its reward system to promote
more valuable outputs from its knowledge creators. Similarly,
market competition for talents loses a reliable mechanism when
attribution is marred with error. As reputation is important and
can only be accumulated over time, the long-term stability of
company growth crucially hinges on an efficacious organization of
attribution, on which reputation is based.29 In this light, attribution
28. Differences of concern and approach between mine and some literature
on moral rights are thus clear. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli,
Authors' and Artists' Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal and Economic
Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 95 (1997) (arguing that moral rights permit artists
to maintain a negative servitude over his work); Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism,
Economics, and the Droit Moral, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1997) (arguing that the
right of integrity is indeterminate under a version of Coasian transaction cost
analysis).
29. My discussion is very brief because Fisk has superbly analyzed the
247
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of intellectual contribution has its independent value separate from
intellectual property ownership and represents an indispensable
social organization for both knowledge creators and users.
C. Transaction Costs and Optimal Number of Attributions
Consider the following hypothetical. After Professor A
reminded Professor B that a judge wrote a paper on an issue of
standing, Professor B got more interested and interrupted by
asking who the judge was. Professor A, however, was only sure
that it appeared in Harvard Law Review. Without the author
name, Professor A could not be more specific and Professor B had
no idea which article it exactly was. It suggests that the
transaction cost associated with their communication was
sufficiently high to make their academic exchange incomplete.
Similar transaction costs would arise if they, instead, asked a
research assistant to find a copy of the article. The research
assistant would incur additional transaction cost when
communicating it to a librarian or searching for it in a database.
While my emphasis of transaction cost can go on with other
examples, they are not necessary.
It is interesting to observe that Justice Antonin Scalia, in Dastar
Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., raised a similar
concern about high transaction cost.
Reading "origin" in § 43(a) to require attribution of
uncopyrighted materials would pose serious
practical problems. Without a copyrighted work as
the basepoint, the word "origin" has no discernable
limits. A video of the MGM film Carmen Jones,
after its copyright has expired, would presumably
require attribution not just to MGM, but to Oscar
Hammerstein II (who wrote the musical on which
the film was based), to Georges Bizet (who wrote
the opera on which the musical was based), and to
Prosper M6rim6e (who wrote the novel on which
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the opera was based).3"
Justice Scalia's practical concern with "no discernable limits"
helps not only pin down the court's decision, but also illuminates
the need for a convention.' The economic reason behind the legal
citation convention is that it helps reduce transaction costs
involved in communications among scholars, between scholars
and their assistants, and between acquisition staffs of a library and
publishers, etc. The convention involves several pieces of
information. It is not unusual for legal scholars to publish more
than an article a year, which have different titles and appear in
different journals, and sustain a long-lasting publishing career.
The hypothetical example of high transaction costs is, however,
not purely related to authorial names.
High transaction costs associated with authorial attribution are
more evident in communicating a journal article that involves
many authors. It is growingly common that more than four or five
persons are attributed as joint authors of a journal article in fields
of science, engineering, medicine, and even business
management.32 If an author's name was unknown or forgotten
during two scholars' exchange of ideas, they would have to incur
additional transaction costs before a specific article could be
identified. The problem of high transaction costs is particularly
acute when some, not all, authors overlap in a number of articles.
It usually occurs when several combinations of intellectual
collaborators are involved in theorizing and experimenting. A
little arithmetic can show that, with three authors, there are seven
possible ways for one to be unsure about a specific article. The
30. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 35
(2003) (emphasis added).
31. The "too many names" point was noticed recently and considered to be
an impediment to more "Beme-Consistent" interpretation. See Graeme W.
Austin, The Berne Convention as a Canon of Construction: Moral Rights after
Dastar, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 111 (2005).
32. See Canon Computer Sys., Inc. v. Nu-Kote Int'l, Inc., 134 F.3d 1085,
1088 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (opining that a patent was not invalid for naming 16
inventors); Walter W. Powell, Interorganizational Collaboration in the
Biotechnology Industry, 151 J. INSTIT'L & THEO. ECON. 197 (1996) (citing an
article coauthored by 45 scientists); W. B. Weeks, et al., Changes in Authorship
Patterns in Prestigious US Medical Journals, 59 Soc. SC. & MED. 1949 (2004).
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number increases with a factorial of n, the number of authors. If
there are k overlapping authors and m articles with the total
number of authors being n, it will be a challenge for anyone not
specialized in math to figure out how many possible ways he could
forget the specific attributions in an article. Nevertheless, it is
clear that transaction costs increase more than proportionately with
k and n.
Attribution in the case of a motion picture is not very much
different. A long list of participating actors, actresses, and
production crew is usually presented at the end of a movie.
Audiences would, however, pay much more attention to the much
shorter list announcing, at the beginning, the director, the lead
actor, and the lead actress. It indicates that the social value of the
long list is far below that of the shorter list. Two technical points
arise from the above examples and discussions. First, as the
disproportional increase of communication costs with the number
of attributions of a knowledge work suggests, the marginal
transaction cost curve of an additional attribution slopes upward.
Second, as the neglected long list of participating production crew
suggests, the marginal social benefit curve of an additional
attribution is downward sloping. Taken together, the two curves
intersect each other, and the unique intersection gives the optimal
number of attributions.33 The same analysis applies to the optimal
number of attributions of an invention. Thus, with many
participants involved, it is inefficient to grant attribution to every
participant of a knowledge project-the first element of the
economic logic.
III. THE EFFICIENT BOUNDARY OF INVENTORSHIP AND
AUTHORSHIP
In order to get a more definite result on whom to grant
attribution in court, transaction costs associated with knowledge
33. See Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights:
A Study of the American West, 18 J. LAW & ECON. 163 (1975); Michael C.
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Specific and General Knowledge, and
Organizational Structure, in CONTRACT ECONOMICS 251 (Lars Werin & Hans
Wijkander eds.1992), for the general approach interpreting the intersection of
the marginal benefit and cost curves as optimal.
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creation need to be carefully examined as well. The deepening of
specialization and the division of labor as the market continues to
develop reminds us of two things. First, when market competition
or substitutability exists, the transaction cost associated with
market exchange is significantly reduced. Second, for a variety of
reasons, not everything is exchanged in the market. This Section
takes up the two reminders and analyzes the attribution
determination issues involved. By paying attention to the use of
existing knowledge through market and the creation of new
scientific or artistic knowledge through virtual transactions, I
obtain the tests of market substitutability and confirmed project
idea. Their two corresponding elements of economic logic,
therefore, establish this Note's central proposition that intellectual
contribution is the efficient boundary of inventorship and
authorship.
A. Make-or-Buy Decision and Market Substitutability Test
Consider the following hypothetical case, where the knowledge
work per se is not at dispute and the court is only to determine
whether Ms. A or Mr. B should be attributed as the sole inventor or
author. Suppose Ms. A paid Mr. B for services rendered in steps
two, three, and six. That is, Ms. A hired a research assistant to
gather data, conduct experiments, and bum a CD of the written
result of the knowledge project. Suppose further that Ms. A
independently initiated an idea for the project, confirmed the
project idea after a few iterations in acquiring above services, and
instantiated the confirmed project idea with a theory. Before
getting into the court's decision, let us further consider that Ms. A
could have independently performed steps two, three, and six, just
as she could have paid others to perform steps one, four, and five.
The question now is why she made the particular mix of make-or-
buy decisions.
It brings us to Coase's point that there is a transaction cost
associated with market exchange. To be sure, transaction cost and
price are two separate ideas.34 Emphatically, Ms. A's payment was
34. Price and transaction cost were mixed up to challenge the famous Coase
Theorem in a bargaining model where the parties would endlessly continue to
offer and counter-offer when the offer transmission price is reduced to zero.
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not her transaction cost but the price she paid for services rendered
by Mr. B. Instead, her transaction cost could only be seen through
her opportunity cost. For instance, Mr. B might be able to recover
the confirmed project idea, like reverse engineering, through Ms.
A's instructions on experiments and complete the remaining
instantiating and fixing steps. Thus, Mr. B, rather than Ms. A,
could be in a position to proclaim sole inventorship through patent
application or sole authorship through copyright registration.
Were this Ms. A's concern, her transaction cost in hiring Mr. B for
the steps would be very high.35 Not until specialization and market
division of labor have developed to such an extent that the
associated transaction cost became negligible in her own
assessment, would she consider a market exchange to save her
energy or time for the project. Ms. A outsourced steps two, three,
and six and carried out steps one, four, and five alone because Mr.
B acquired only established knowledge and could not, under her
supervision, easily engage in reverse engineering to
misappropriate her project.36
Inasmuch as Mr. B claimed in court that he should be granted
the right of attribution, a useful test for courts immediately comes
out from the above transaction cost analysis. The test of market
substitutability examines if Mr. B's endeavors were substitutable
in the market. If the test result is affirmative, then efficiency
consideration should dictate a decision for Ms. A. First, as the
above analysis suggests, a substitutable service in the market
means that the transaction cost between Ms. A and Mr. B was low.
Second, being market substitutable, knowledge associated with the
However, fully rational agents would not engage in such endless bargaining but
spend time elsewhere, if the true opportunity cost were correctly modeled. The
transaction cost driving the alleged "Hobbesian Theorem" thus is unspecified,
but not zero. See Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1982).
35. The transaction cost can be measured as the additional sum needed to
secure her project from being misappropriated. It would be prohibitive if she
could not effectively prevent Mr. B from misappropriating her intellectual
contribution.
36. Supervision involves measurement and monitoring costs. See Armen A.
Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Prodcution, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 777 (1972); Yoram Barzel, Measurement
Costs and the Organization of Markets, 25 J.L. & EcON. 27 (1982).
[Vol. XIX:2252
18
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 3
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol19/iss2/3
2009] EFFICIENT BNDRY INVNTRSHIP & A UTHRSHIP
service has already been exploited through market specialization;
therefore, it is already rewarded and needs not be further
promoted. Consistent with the policy goal of promoting science
and useful arts, a decision favoring Ms. A would help her complete
the project faster or work on more projects in the same time. A
decision in favor of Mr. B, in contrast, would promote existing
knowledge in the market but not future creation of new
knowledge. Thus, it is inefficient to grant attribution to whoever
made nothing but market substitutable endeavors-the second
element of the economic logic.
B. Virtual Transaction and Confirmed Project Idea Test
When the result of the market substitutability test is negative, it
implies that Mr. B made at least a market non-substitutable
endeavor. Another extreme case, however, might drive the
negative test result. It involves the situation where Ms. A initiated
a project idea and did nothing else but pay Mr. B to pursue
whatever he saw fit. It necessarily implies that Mr. B alone
performed all consistent workflow steps of the knowledge work
whose attribution is at dispute. With which workflow steps was
Mr. B's allegedly market non-substitutable endeavor associated?
Was there an intellectual contribution by Ms. A or Mr. B? And to
whom should the court grant attribution, Ms. A or Mr. B? An
analysis is needed before answering these questions.
In the perspective of transaction cost analysis, a knowledge
creator must engage in a virtual transaction with targeted patrons
in her mind. For example, they can be promoters of various
artistic works, patent examiners for inventors, and journal referees
for professors and researchers.37 As she works and reiterates
between the workflow steps trying to persuade her targeted
patrons, there is a cost associated with the virtual transaction. The
transaction cost is different from that associated with her make-or-
buy decision alluded to earlier. It is not market substitutable and
must be borne by her alone, because the virtual transaction exists
only between her and the fictitious patrons she envisions.
In comparison with Coase's detailing of transaction costs in
37. General audience, consumers, or academic community are certainly a
part of knowledge creators' targeted patrons.
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different stages of an exchange process, she cannot realistically
inform her targeted patrons that she "wishes to deal and on what
terms" in the virtual transaction.38 The virtual transaction is only a
thought process and she cannot get a meaningful feedback from
her targeted patrons until late at the end. Whether the knowledge
work she envisions would satisfy her targeted patrons' tastes,
hence, cannot be tested until she has made significant investment
of time and energy in completing all necessary workflow steps.
Without the opportunity to communicate and bargain, the risk of
losing all her investment of time and energy is very significant.
The transaction cost of a virtual transaction is, therefore, much
higher than that of a Coasian real exchange. The concern with the
high transaction cost may inhibit her from engaging in the creation
of new scientific or artistic knowledge.
The inherent high transaction cost and risk justify the
constitutional promotion and protection of knowledge creators'
adventuring into virtual transactions.39 Since a virtual transaction
must be intellectual in nature, the analysis also shows that
intellectual contributions, if any, are necessarily associated with
market non-substitutable virtual transactions. As the earlier prose-
writing simulation has also suggested, virtual transactions occur
primarily in the steps of confirming the project idea and
instantiating the consistent project idea. More importantly,
without the confirmed project idea, there could not be consistent
instantiation, and the virtual transaction would be unpersuasive to
targeted patrons.
In light of the analysis, I return to my initial questions with
another useful test-the confirmed project idea test. The test
examines if Mr. B's confirmed project idea was envisioned by Ms.
A. Given that the test result was negative, Mr. B, not Ms. A, has
38. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, in THE FIRM, THE MARKET,
AND THE LAW 95, 114 (1988).
39. The protection of IP as an object for commercial exchange can help
reduce the virtual transaction costs in persuading general audience, academic
peers, and consumers; nevertheless, some knowledge work may not have any
pecuniary benefit associated with 1P. Additionally, promoters of artistic works,
patent examiners, and journal referees, who control knowledge work's access to
the "market", may have different interests and tastes from end users. Direct
help through attribution protection, therefore, also encourages knowledge
creators at this stage.
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made the intellectual contribution. A decision in favor of Ms. A
would therefore be contrary to the constitutionally intended
purpose, because she did not bear the necessary transaction cost
and risk in envisioning the consistent project and persuading her
targeted patrons. Given a decision against Mr. B, attribution's
organizational roles in reward, discipline, signaling, and reputation
would all be disrupted. Without being attributed, Mr. B's targeted
patrons would never recognize him, and his bearing of the market
non-substitutable transaction cost would have been wasteful. A
decision against Mr. B would also deter knowledge creation
otherwise available through future payees, while future Ms. A
would still not engage in any virtual transaction necessary for
knowledge creation. The test of confirmed project idea thus leads
to the third element of the economic logic-it is inefficient to grant
attribution to whoever only paid others for a consistent project she
did not envision.
In sum, the tests of market substitutability and confirmed project
idea reveal the two sides of a coin. The first test shows that market
substitutable endeavors represent only the application of existing
knowledge but not creation of new scientific or artistic knowledge,
which, as the second test shows, is exactly the result of an
intellectual contribution obtained through market non-substitutable
virtual transactions. Thus, abstracting from opportunistic
behaviors between intellectual collaborators, the two tests and
corresponding elements of the economic logic establish that
intellectual contribution is the efficient boundary of inventorship
and authorship. Note that the two tests were introduced by
assuming that the given knowledge work indeed contained new
knowledge. Yet, there could even be a dispute over whether an
inventive or authorial work contained new scientific or artistic
knowledge. Nevertheless, intellectual contribution should still be
what the court looks for in such a dispute, because inventorship
and inventive work as well as authorship and authorial work are
also two sides of the same coin-there cannot be one without the
other. Intellectual contribution is, therefore, also the efficient
boundary in determining invention conception and copyright
originality.40
40. The economic analysis uniquely links patent and copyright issues that
have generally been considered separate and different. See, e.g., Russ VerSteeg,
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IV. EFFICIENT COURT STANDARDS
This Section summarizes my review of frequently cited court
cases to show how judges have seemingly adopted the workflow
model and the set of economic logic to develop their court
standards. I begin with a summary of court determinations of
invention conception in Subsection A. A summary of court
standards on copyright originality is in Subsection B. They
precede the summary of court standards on sole inventorship and
sole authorship for two reasons. First, the validity of a patent and
copyrighted work may be challenged. Second, invention
conception and copyright originality are similarly not defined in
the laws and courts have considered them the touchstones of patent
and copyright protection." The two subsections show that
intellectual contribution comes out clearly as the courts'
established boundary of both invention conception and copyright
originality. Consistent with the tests of market substitutability and
confirmed project idea, intellectual contribution also comes out as
the established boundary of sole inventorship and sole authorship
in Subsection C.
A. Invention Conception
There are three prongs of the enduring invention conception
standard of definite and permanent idea, which originated from the
invention of a printing machine in the old case of Mergenthaler v.
Scudder.42 First, conception is about the "mental part of the
inventive act," and there are "mental acts" toward the result to be
Intent, Originality, Creativity and Joint Authorship, 68 BROOKLYN L. REV. 123
(2002); Jackie Hutter, Note, A Definite and Permanent Idea? Invention in the
Pharmaceutical and Chemical Sciences and the Determination of Conception in
Patent Law, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 687 (1995), for other approaches to issues
of invention conception and copyright originality.
41. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991)
("Originality is the touchstone of copyright protection."); Burroughs Wellcome
Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1227-28 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("Conception is
the touchstone of inventorship, the completion of the mental part of
invention.").
42. Mergenthaler v. Scudder, 11 App. D.C. 264, 276-78 (1897).
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obtained and in producing that result.43 If the mental part of the
result to be obtained is only an idea, then confirming the idea is the
corresponding mental act. The mental act in producing the result,
thus, involves the instantiation of the idea through a means.
Second, such mental activity must reach the level of a definite and
permanent idea. It's definite and permanent when the idea
"becomes so clearly defined in the mind of the inventor as to be
capable of exterior expression."' In this sense, a confirmed
project idea and its consistent instantiations are strictly
distinguished from the pure act of fixing them into a tangible
medium. Thirdly, the inventive idea must be complete and
operative in the sense that "[a]ll that remains to be accomplished,
in order to perfect the act or instrument, belongs to the department
of construction, not invention."45 Thus, the inventive idea is not
complete until the instantiations include "all the essential
attributes" of the invention. In addition, the pure act of fixing
them into a tangible medium is excluded from the inventive acts.
Consistent with the set of economic logic obtained, the three
prongs clearly indicate that intellectual contribution was the
court's established boundary of invention conception. It also helps
understand why Justice Alvey indicated that a description or an
illustration could demonstrate the completeness of the mental
activity such that physical reduction to practice would be
unnecessary.
The boundary of invention conception withstood further tests as
technological advancement began to emerge in other fields of
industrial art. Unpredictability associated with experiments and its
implication to invention conception became the central issue in the
case of Smith v. Bousquet.46 The court held that conjecturing a
particular mix of solutions did not meet invention conception
because experimental results might turn out to be unexpected.47
43. Id. at 276.
44. Id. at 278.
45. Id. at 276.
46. See Smith v. Bousquet, 111 F.2d 157 (C.C.P.A. 1940). Also see Thomas
P. Nound, Mark S. Carlson, and Paul T. Meiklejohn, Patent Law Issues Affected
by the Predictability of Technology in the Field of Invention, 88 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 603 (2006), for a broader discussion of the
unpredictability topic.
47. Smith, I 11 F.2d at 164 (refusing to award priority date based on
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Thus, when simultaneous conception is claimed, the case
established that it is paramount for a claimant to show the
reduction of the idea to practice by conducting experiments. The
plan to carry out experiments, with uncertain results, is not enough
for inventorship.
However, depending on the maturity of a particular technology,
experiments may not be necessary for invention conception.
Indeed, the court in Land v. Dreyer relaxed the standard to that
which "would enable a person skilled in the art to reduce the
conception to practice without any further research or exercise of
the inventive skill."48 The reference of "a person skilled in the art"
and Justice Alvey's "department of construction" indicate that
applications of existing stock of knowledge and intellectual
contribution in creating new knowledge were clearly
distinguished. The court in Applegate v. Scherer further affirmed
that a sufficient disclosure through letter, even before constructive
reduction, met the requirement of conception.49 Consistent with
the market substitutability test, experimental skills, unless
exceptional, gradually were considered skilled art and not
inventive."
The problem-solving orientation of the workflow model has
been embraced in more recent cases involving pharmaceutical or
biotechnology related invention as issues of physical reduction to
practice and experiments resurfaced. In the case of Oka v.
Youssefyeh, the court reaffirmed that being able to describe a
chemical compound and being in possession of a method of
making it were two different matters in the field." The court
correctly ruled that conception required both. The court in
laboratory tests when it was still uncertain what effects would result from tests
under more realistic conditions).
48. Land v. Dreyer, 155 F.2d 383, 387 (C.C.P.A. 1946) (emphasis added).
49. Applegate v. Scherer, 332 F.2d 571 (C.C.P.A 1964); see also Seawall v.
Waters, 21 F.3d 411, 415 (Fed. Cir. 1994); In re Tansel, 253 F.2d 241, 836
(C.C.P.A. 1958) ("[T]he final size and shape of every part . . .[need not] be
exactly foreseen before the conception of an apparatus can be said to be
complete.").
50. See Fina Oil & Chem. Co. v. Ewen, 123 F.3d 1466, 1473 (Fed. Cir.
1997); Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1229 (Fed.
Cir. 1994).
51. Oka v. Youssefyeh, 849 F.2d 581,583 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co. opined that knowing a
principal biological property was not sufficient to show the
"specificity" in defining the identity of a newly discovered
material. 2 The specificity was related to Justice Alvey's "all the
essential attributes" and the workflow model's various
instantiations. The court concluded, "when an inventor is unable
to envision the detailed constitution of a gene . . . as well as a
method for obtaining it, conception has not been achieved until...
the gene has been isolated."53  With similar emphasis on the
specificity of the inventor's idea, Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr
Laboratories, Inc. is particularly lucid in two additional aspects.
First, the court explicitly held, "[a]n idea is definite and permanent
when the inventor has a specific, settled idea, a particular solution
to the problem at hand, not just a general goal or research plan he
hopes to pursue."54 Second, the court went on to hold that "patent
rights attach only when an idea is so far developed that the
inventor can point to a definite, particular invention."55  As a
whole, the court's reference to "the definite, particular invention"
and "the particular solution to the problem at hand" indicates that
the boundary of invention conception was clarified in a way
consistent with the workflow model's emphasis of a problem-
solving orientation toward a consistent project. 6
52. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
53. Id. at 1206. Specificity also became the center of several later cases. See
Hitzeman v. Rutter, 243 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (particle size and
sedimentation rate related to hepatitis B surface antigen); Fiers v. Revel, 984
F.2d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (isolation of a DNA sequence); Chiron v. Abbott
Labs., 902 F. Supp 1103 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (nucleotide sequence of an H1V
fragment).
54. Burroughs, 40 F.3d at 1228 (emphasis added).
55. Id. (emphasis added).
56. See Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1064 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (using the "problem-solving" phraseology and citing Burroughs, 40
F.3d at 1229). A search of "problem solving and invention" through the
LexisNexis database shows that of the 12 cases meeting the search criteria only
Invitrogen was related to the conception issue. The remaining cases were all
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B. Copyright Originality
The development of efficient invention conception standards
was accompanied by a parallel development in holding intellectual
contribution as the court's established boundary of copyright
originality. The landmark case of Burrow-Giles Lithograph Co. v.
Sarony shows that the Supreme Court seemingly adopted the
workflow model to determine whether a photograph met copyright
originality.57 At the outset, the Court considered the issue to be
whether photographs were "representatives of original intellectual
conceptions of the author."58  Two notable points were in the
Court's findings. First, the Court distinguished mental conception
and its fixing in the visible form of a picture. Second, the Court
identified a number of acts, including the steps of "posing the said
Oscar Wilde ... selecting and arranging the costume... arranging
the subject ... arranging and disposing the light and shade, [and]
suggesting and evoking the desired expression."59
In other words, the Court examined how the photographer
instantiated his confirmed project idea to produce the consistent
picture. The Court established intellectual contribution as the
boundary of copyright originality because the picture was not
merely a "mechanical reproduction" of some object that involved
no "originality of thought" or any novelty in the "intellectual
operation," but the "original conception" of the author.6
Consistent with the economic analysis, the extension of copyright
protection from writings in the Constitution to photographs
indicates clearly that artistic acts rather than forms constitute
copyright originality and authorship.
About a hundred years later, the Supreme Court was once again
faced with copyright originality in the case of Feist Publications,
Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., where the copyright of a
telephone directory was in dispute. The opinion delivered by
57. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 55-59 (1884).
58. Id. at 58 (emphasis added). This use of "intellectual conception"
preceded Mergenthaler, the patent case which focused on the same principles,
by thirteen years. It suggests that intellectual contribution has long been the
focus of copyright originality.
59. Id. at 55.
60. Id. at 59.
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Justice Sandra O'Connor correctly reaffirmed that only intellectual
contribution beyond "sweat of the brow" or "industrious
collection" deserves copyright protection. In her progression of
analysis toward the Court's decision, there were three essential
points. First, in determining whether a fact-based work meets
copyright originality, she opined that the focus should be on "the
manner in which the collected facts have been selected,
coordinated, and arranged. ' 61 Second, the manner in selecting and
arranging the listing in the instant case, however, showed no
intellectual contribution. Facts showed that the data were provided
by its subscribers, and the list was in alphabetical order by
surname; additionally, the manner of arrangement of the listing
was "an age-old practice. '62 It was, thus, only "a garden-variety
white pages directory, devoid of even the slightest trace of
creativity."63  Whatever phrases she used in referring to the low
threshold of copyright originality-"minimal degree of creativity,"
"the modicum of creativity", or "de minimis quantum of
creativity"-Justice O'Connor clearly meant creativity to be
exactly intellectual contribution. It was so because she has
specifically linked the "minimum degree of creativity" of The
Trade-Mark Cases with the "intellectual production, of thought,
and conception" of Burrow-Giles.64
And third, her elucidation against the flaws of the doctrine of
"sweat of the brow" or "industrious collection" was in perfect
consistency with the workflow model's emphasis on the
distinction between market substitutable endeavor and market non-
61. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 358 (1991)
(emphasis added).
62. Id. at 363.
63. Id. at 362, 363 (emphasis added).
64. The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879). Nevertheless, the use of
creativity was imprecise and confusing. See, e.g., Goldstein v. California, 412
U.S. 546, 561 (1973) (using creative intellectual or aesthetic labor); Baltimore
Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n., 805 F.2d 663, 668 (7th
Cir. 1986) (stating that a copyrightable work "must be original and creative, but
need not be novel"); West Publ'g Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219,
1225 (8th Cir. 1986) (using originality and intellectual-creation as dual
requirements); Am. Dental Ass'n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass'n, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1714, 1720 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (stating that imagination serves as the
touchstone of creativity), vacated, 126 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 1997).
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substitutable intellectual contribution. Sweat of the brow in
gathering, selecting, coordinating, and arranging preexisting data
in the instant case was nothing but market substitutable endeavor.
Seemingly sifting through all the workflow steps, she concluded
that "copyright rewards originality, not effort."65  Thus, at the
opposite end of the spectrum from Burrow-Giles, Feist was a case
showing no intellectual contribution in printed materials at all. In
perfect consistency with the economic logic, the two contrasting
cases, almost one hundred years apart, show the two sides of the
efficient boundary of copyright originality.
C. Sole Inventorship and Authorship
The above findings suggest that intellectual contribution should
come out as the courts' established boundary of sole inventorship
and sole authorship as well. The summary of case reviews on
inventorship and authorship can thus be made succinct here for
two reasons. First, cases on invention conception and copyright
originality show similar court findings concerning inventorship
and authorship; therefore, reporting of intellectual contribution
findings would only be repetitious. Second, since the efficient
boundary of intellectual contribution is argued without considering
opportunistic behaviors between two intellectual collaborators, a
review of joint inventorship and authorship cases deserves
separate, full attention elsewhere.6 6  Inasmuch as court
inventorship and authorship standards of mere suggestion, mere
conception, and employee improvement are directly related to
market substitutability and confirmed project idea tests, this
subsection focuses on showing how perfectly consistent with the
economic logic and efficient they are.
To begin with, the court in Seshadri v. Kasraian opined that the
help from a research assistant, secretary, draftsman or commenting
65. Feist, 499 U.S. at 364.
66. My empirical studies reveal that inefficiency only occurred much more
recently in joint authorship standards developed after the Copyright Act of
1976. The source of inefficiency is related to opportunistic behaviors lurking in
intellectual collaboration and institutional differences between copyright law
and patent law. See Steven S. Kan, Court Standards on Joint Inventorship and
Authorship, 19 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH., & INTELL. PROP. L. 17 Part IV (2009).
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colleague in the preparation of a scholarly paper did not entitle the
helper to claim the status of a joint author.67 Apparently consistent
with the market substitutability test, the kind of help does not
constitute authorship because there is no intellectual contribution.
In the more complicated case of Polye v. Uhl, the litigants were
friends and they separately filed patent applications. 68 The court
found that Uhl had suggested to Polye several ways to possibly
solve his problem but had not even vaguely referred to "[t]he
amount to be used, the nature and composition of the electrolyte,
and the question of whether or not a catalyst would be required."69
The court thus concluded that Uhl could not be an inventor
because he only showed "mere existence of an intellectual notion
that a certain thing could be done, and, if done, might be of
practical utility."7 A careful reading of the case confirms that the
decision was in perfect consistency with the market substitutability
test, because Uhl's suggestions to Polye's problem were picked up
from a reference book and a handbook.
The related standard of mere conception was established in
Forgie v. Oilwell Supply Co.71 Forgie approached Barrett to
discuss problems of drilling tools and suggested that a lifting jack
could in some manner be utilized to help couple and uncouple a
drill rod. Barrett later successfully came up with a new drilling
tool. Forgie, nevertheless, filed a patent application and sued
Barrett for patent infringement. The court opined that the plaintiff,
when approaching the defendant, "had no definite plan in his
mind; that he was in pursuit of information and aid; that various
plans were talked about; and that finally the conclusion was that
Barrett's jack, to be altered as Barrett suggested, was the one that
would do the work."72 Thus, Forgie only initiated a problem to
Barrett but did not show any intellectual contribution; the
confirmed project idea and the consistent instantiations were all
67. Seshadri v. Kasraian, 130 F.3d 798 (7th Cir. 1997).
68. Polye v. Uhl, 328 F. 2d 893 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
69. Id. at 898.
70. Id. (quoting Standard Cartridge Co. v. Peters Cartridge Co., 77 F. 630,
645 (6th Cir. 1896)). There exist many similar cases of mere suggestions
between friends, co-workers, or employers. See, e.g., O'Donnell v. Hartt, 75
F.2d 195 (C.C.P.A. 1935).
71. Forgie v. Oilwell Supply Co., 58 F. 871, 877 (3d Cir. 1893).
72. Id. at 876.
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Barrett's.
Both market substitutability and the confirmed project idea tests
were involved in the very old patent infringement case of Agawam
Co. v. Jordan, where the defendant alleged that the true inventor
was not the patentee but his employee.73 The Court's decision was
efficient and accorded well with the market substitutability test.
The case was also known for establishing the standard of
"employee improvement." It means that "no suggestions from an
employee, not amounting to a new method or arrangement, which,
in itself is a complete invention, is sufficient to deprive the
employer of the exclusive property in the perfected
improvement."74  In other words, an employer cannot be an
inventor if the employee developed an independently patentable
invention outside of the scope of the employer's conceived plan.
Misapplication of the standard of mere suggestion by the lower
court occurred in the copyright case of Andrien v. Southern Ocean
County Chamber of Commerce, where Andrien, the plaintiff,
engaged Carolyn Haines to do the artwork for a compilation of
preexisting maps and other information assembled.75 The lower
court held that Andrien only supplied information and ideas and it
was Haines who translated the ideas into a fixed, tangible
expression. The appellate court correctly overruled by finding that
"none of Haines' activities in any way intellectually modified or
technically enhanced the concept articulated by Andrien."76 Since
Andrien already envisioned a project and only needed help for
fixing it in a tangible medium, the appellate court properly applied
both the market substitutability and confirmed project idea tests.
The case of Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental
Laboratory, Inc. involved a custom-made business management
software program, and the defendants claimed sole ownership on
the ground that the plaintiff was a contractor to develop the work.77
Going through the workflow steps, the court opined, "Such general
73. Agawam Co. v. Jordan, 74 U.S. 583 (1868).
74. Id. at 603.
75. Andrien v. S. Ocean County Chamber of Commerce, 927 F.2d 132, 133
(3d Cir. 1991)
76. Id. at 135.
77. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1307
(E.D. Pa. 1985).
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assistance and contributions to the fund of knowledge of the author
did not make [defendant] a creator of any original work, nor even
the co-author."78  As in any commissioned work, one who
commissions must provide necessary information before a
contractor can take up the problem and come up with a customized
solution. The court's decision was perfectly consistent with the
economic logic-it is inefficient to grant attribution to whoever
did nothing but paid others for a consistent project she did not
envision. "
In sum, the above case reviews show perfect consistency
between the economic logic obtained and court established
standards. Though intuitively appealing, the proposition that
intellectual contribution is the efficient boundary of inventorship
and authorship is for the first time shown theoretically and
empirically.
V. CONCLUSION
The confirmed project idea of this Note is to shed light on how
judges have contributed to the development of the United States
into the world's top knowledge center in the twentieth century. An
economic analysis based on the workflow model of knowledge
creation and a review of frequently cited cases form two parts of
the consistent project. The economic analysis is instantiated with
attribution's organizational value separate from intellectual
property ownership, the distinction between a virtual transaction
and a Coasian real exchange, and the clarification between market
substitutable endeavor and intellectual contribution via virtual
transaction. The set of economic logic obtained establishes that
intellectual contribution is the efficient boundary of invention
conception and inventorship, and copyright originality and
authorship. The case reviews are instantiated through a special
attention to the process-centered and problem-solving oriented
workflow steps. The reviews show that, consistent with the
economic logic, judges have successfully established intellectual
78. Id. at 1318.
79. See also Geshwind v. Garrick, 734 F. Supp. 644 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
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contribution as the efficient boundary of invention conception,
copyright originality, sole inventorship, and sole authorship.
The consistent project is thus accomplished to help appreciate
how judges have contributed in protecting true inventors and
authors making intellectual contributions. Notably, the cases
reviewed span a long period during which law and economics
were unknown to judges. Nevertheless, they insisted in examining
acts associated with knowledge creation rather than forms of
knowledge work, discerning structural changes of technological
progress and economic development, and in distinguishing market
substitutable endeavors from virtual transactions leading to
intellectual contribution. American judges thus have remarkably
served the Constitution's purpose in promoting science and useful
arts. Though dwarfed by the judges' success in developing these
efficient court standards, the law and economic analysis presented
in this Note represents a useful, succinct reconstruction of their
legendary intellectual contributions for lasting protection of true
inventors and authors in the future.
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